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Unitariness and Busing: Placing the
Burden of Proof for Obtaining Judicial
Review When a School Board Stops
Busing
WASHINGTON, Nov. 3 - The Supreme Court declined today
to resolve an apparent conflict among Federal appellate courts
on how to deal with efforts by school boards to dismantle court-
ordered desegregation plans, which could be the nHst important
desegregation issue of the next decade.
To the surprise of some legal experts, the Court declined to
review both a ruling that allowed Norfolk, Va., to end its court-
ordered busing of elementary children and a seemingly conflict-
ing ruling against the school board in Oklahoma City.'
I. Introduction
As we entered the eighties the matter of busing left the news
after occupying it for twenty-five years. Desegregated schools
seemed to be working. Two recent cases, however, have put the bus-
ing issue back in the headlines. On November 3, 1986, the Supreme
Court of the United States declined to resolve an apparent conflict in
appellate court decisions concerning busing.' The cases involved pre-
viously segregated school systems that federal courts integrated with
busing orders. After these schools systems completed the process of
dismantling dual (segregated) schools and created unitary (fully in-
tegrated) schools, the federal courts returned control of the schools
to the local school boards. The courts originally obtained jurisdiction
because the school systems intentionally discriminated on the basis
of race. The issue presented by those cases in November of last year
I. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1986, at AI, col. I. The reporter misses the importance of the
Norfolk case, which was this: the school board was allowed to stop busing without seeking
court approval. Parents seeking to challenge the resegregation of the elementary schools were
faced with the burden of showing that the school board's action was taken with the purpose of
discriminating on the basis of race. For a discussion of the Norfolk case, see infrd notes 6-19
and accompanying text.
2. Wash. Post, Nov. 4, 1986, at AI, col. 4. The reasons the Court declined to hear the
cases were not given. The reporter hypothesized that the justices were reluctant to speak on
this already confusing issue without consensus. Id. at A8, col. 1. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1986, at
Al, col. 1. The Times posited that the justices might have personally given the lower courts
broad discretion at the risk of inconsistency. Id.
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was whether a school board, having regained full control of its own
system, could stop busing if it stopped for reasons other than inten-
tional discrimination. One appellate court3 ruled that if a school
board wants to modify its busing plan, it must get court approval.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals," however, decided that after
integration the school board regained complete control. Therefore,
the board could stop busing and implement a neighborhood school
plan without court approval. This decision could reduce busing else-
where without court supervision.5
The decision is Riddick v. School Board of the City of Nor-
folk.' In Riddick, local parents challenged the Norfolk school sys-
tem's proposal to stop busing elementary students. The Fourth Cir-
cuit upheld a district court decision which required those challenging
the school board to show that the board adopted the plan to discrimi-
nate on the basis of race.7 Norfolk has a history of racial discrimina-
tion that was the subject of earlier litigation.8 After eight years of
litigation the school district implemented a desegregation plan. The
district court found that by 1975 the school system had satisfied its
affirmative duty to integrate, and therefore, had achieved
unitariness.8
Recently, Norfolk has experienced white flight10 and declining
3. Dowell v. Board of Education, 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1986). See infra notes 21-27.
4. Riddick v. School Board, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986). See infra notes 6-19.
5. See infra notes 6-19 and accompanying text.
6. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986).
7. Id. at 543.
8. Id. at 524. The integration litigation began in Beckett v. School Board, 148 F. Supp.
430 (E.D. Va.), affd, 246 F.2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 355 U.S. 855 (1957), and contin-
ued in Brewer v. School Board, 349 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1965). See Tucker, Reflections on
Virginia's Reaction to Brown, 4 J.L. & EDUc. 36 (1975) in which the author briefly discusses
Virginia's extraordinary opposition to desegregation, including state sanctioned resistance to
the deliberate speed doctrine.
9. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 525. The criteria for a finding of unitariness are desegregated
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, facilities, and student body. Green v.
New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). The Riddick order which declared
the system unitary reads:
ORDER
It appearing to the Court that all issues in this action have been disposed of,
that the School Board of the City of Norfolk has satisfied its affirmative duty to
desegregate, that racial discrimination through official action has been elimi-
nated from the system, and that the Norfolk School System is now "unitary,"
the Court doth accordingly ORDER AND DECREE that this action is hereby
dismissed, with leave to any party to reinstate this action for good cause shown.
784 F.2d at 525.
10. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 525-26. White student enrollment had dropped drastically.
Enrollment was 57% white and 43% black in the 1969-70 school year. By 1983 the ratio was
42% white and 58% black. Expert testimony predicted the racial ratio would be 25% white and
75% black in 1987 if no action was taken. Id.
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parental involvement.11 In an attempt to solve these problems, the
school board adopted a plan requiring neighborhoods to determine
each elementary school's attendance. 2 Because of segregated resi-
dential patterns, this solution largely resegregated the Norfolk ele-
mentary schools.' 3 The school board instituted an action at the dis-
trict court to obtain court approval. Meanwhile several parents
instituted a class action suit to challenge the proposed plan. The
school board voluntarily dismissed its action for approval and elected
to defend the parents' class action suit.14
The district court ruled that the parents had not met their bur-
den of proof, viz, a showing of discriminatory purpose. 15 In affirming
the district court's ruling, 16 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rea-
soned that a finding of unitariness is more than a statement that a
school has successfully implemented a desegregation plan. The court
concluded that a finding of unitariness terminates the remedial pow-
ers of a court regarding previously constitutional violation. The bur-
den of proof, therefore, shifts from the school board, which otherwise
would have to justify the action,' 7 to the challengers to prove that
the school board had the intent to discriminate.18 The failure to meet
this burden was fatal to the parents' action. In conclusion, the appel-
late court stated: "Our holding is a limited one, applicable only to
those school systems which have succeeded in eradicating all vestiges
of de jure segregation. In those systems, the school boards and not
the federal courts will run the schools, absent a showing of an intent
to discriminate.'1
9
II. Id. at 526. PTA membership dropped from more than 15,000 members in 1977 to
3,500 members in 1981.
12. Id. at 526-27. Single attendance zones determined school attendance. The lines de-
termining neighborhoods were gerrymandered to achieve maximum integration without busing
black children to schools in white neighborhoods and vice versa. But see infra note 13.
13. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 527. The plan requires twelve of thirty-six elementary schools
to be more than 70% black. Of those twelve schools, ten are to be 95% or more black. Under
the previous plan only four elementary schools were over 70% black.
14. Id. at 525.
15. Riddick v. School Board, 627 F. Supp. 814, 827 (E.D. Va. 1984).
16. Riddick v. School Board, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986).
17. Id. at 535. The Fourth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court placed a heavy
burden of showing that any action continuing the effects of illegal discrimination serves a
legitimate end. Id. (citing Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979) (Day-
ton 11)).
18. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 538.
19. Id. at 543. The court continued:
We do not think this is a case in which a school board, upon obtaining a
judicial decision that it is unitary, turns its back on the rights of its minority
students and reverts to its old discriminating ways. If such were the case, we
would, of course, not approve Norfolk's new assignment plan. But such is not the
case. The school board of Norfolk has done a reasonable job in seeking to keep
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In a similar factual situation,2" the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reversed an Oklahoma district court's dismissal of a
challenge to school board action. Dowell v. Board of Education of
Oklahoma City Public Schools"1 again presented an appellate court
with a parental challenge to a school district proposal to adopt a
neighborhood school plan at the elementary school level.22 The back-
ground to this case is similar to that of Riddick.2 a Pursuant to a
court order, the school system implemented a desegregation plan.
The previous litigation terminated with a 1977 order dismissing the
action and declaring the school system unitary. The order, however,
specifically stated that the school system was not expected to dis-
mantle the unitary system painfully accomplished over sixteen
years.2"
The Tenth Circuit considered how to address a finding of
its schools integrated in the face of a massive exodus of white students. We
should not tie its hands and refuse to allow it to try another plan that may be
successful in stopping that exodus.
Id. at 543-44. Despite the placement of a heavy burden on challengers, the court recognized
the need to oversee the modification of plans to prevent backsliding.
20. The Oklahoma City schools experienced problems with their busing plans because it
provided that students in integrated neighborhoods would not be bused. Because of changing
demographics, the schools between the core city and the outer suburbs qualified over the years
for "stand alone" status. This meant increased distanced between densely black and densely
white neighborhoods. In addition, the school system experienced an eighty percent decline in
PTA membership. In 1971, the student population was 76.6% white; in 1985, it was 49.6%
white. Dowell v. Board of Education, 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1551-53 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (findings
of fact).
21. 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1986).
22. Id. at 1518. Of 64 elementary schools in the district, more than half would have
been over 90% black or 90% white. Id.
23. The case commenced as Dowell v. School Board, 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla.
1963), continued as Dowell v. Board of Education, 338 F. Supp. 1256 (W.D. Okla. 1972), and
further continued as Dowell v. Board of Education, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1041 (1972). For a detailed discussion of the procedural aspects of the Dowell case,
see the district court's opinion reported at 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1550 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
24. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals quoted the order:
Nothing in the 1977 order tempered the 1972 mandatory injunction. In
fact, the 1977 order states:
The Court has concluded that . . . [the Finger Plan] was indeed a
Plan that worked and that substantial compliance with the constitutional
requirements has been achieved. The School Board, under the oversight
of the Court, has operated the Plan properly, and the Court does not
foresee that the termination of its jurisdiction will result in the dismantle-
ment of the Plan or any affirmative action by the defendant to undermine
the unitary system so slowly and painfully accomplished over the 16 years
during which the cause has been pending before the Court.
The Court believes that the present members and their successors
on the Board will now and in the future continue to follow the constitu-
tional desegregation requirements.
Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1519. The order indicates that in 1977 the district court foresaw the
possibility of the school board dismantling its desegregation plan.
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unitariness. It rejected the argument that such a finding, without a
new showing of discriminatory intent, precluded court review. 5 The
Court stated, "the parties cannot be thrust back to the proverbial
first square just because the court previously ceased active supervi-
sion . . . [T]here are sound reasons [for courts] to seek the earliest
opportunity to return control of school district affairs to the local
body elected for that purpose .... ."6 Reasoning that the injunction
to implement and maintain the desegregation plan was still in effect,
the Tenth Circuit remanded to determine if the injunction should be
modified or enforced.
27
The conflict between the Riddick and Dowell cases "is the most
important unresolved issue in the school desegregation area."2" This
Comment addresses the precedents that required the busing remedy,
and the precedents that formulated the intent standard required for
judicial intervention. It then examines the effect a finding of unitari-
ness should have. This author recommends that courts should review
decisions to dismantle busing orders because public policy requires
it. The burden of proof to obtain supervision is not strictly allocated
in this instance. Originally a party challenging school board action is
required to show purposeful discrimination. Placing this burden on a
challenger a second time, by requiring the challenger to show that
the dismantlement of busing was not done for neutral reasons, is un-
reasonable. School boards should not be able to undo the desegrega-
tion process upon termination of supervision. Segregated neighbor-
hoods are partially the result of past legally sanctioned
25. Id. at 1520. The court rejected the Fourth Circuit's approach stating:
The Fourth Circuit has taken a different view with which we cannot agree.
In Riddick v. The School Board of the City of Norfolk,-784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.
1986), the court seems to treat a district court order terminating supervision as
an order dissolving a mandated integration plan, despite the absence of a specific
order to that effect. The court makes a bridge between a finding of unitariness
and voluntary compliance with an injunction. We find no foundation for that
bridge. It also appears inconsistent with Lee v. Macon County Board of Educa-
tion, 584 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1978), in which the court held that a finding by the
district court that the school system was "unitary in nature" did not divest the
court of subject matter jurisdiction of a petition to amend the desegregation plan
where the court had not dismissed the case. A finding of unitariness may lead to
many other reasonable conclusions, but it cannot divest a court of its jurisdic-
tion, nor can it convert a mandatory injunction into voluntary compliance.
Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1520 n.3.
26. Dowell, 795 F.2d at 1520. If the burden of showing intent is placed on challengers
prior to court review of school board action to resegregate, the dismantling of busing orders
will be an easy task.
27. Id. at 1522-23.
28. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1986, at A27, col. 4. The quote is attributed to Rex E. Lee,
former Solicitor General of the United States. Lee represented the Oklahoma City school
board in a desegregation case.
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discrimination. Reincorporating this vestige of past segregation into
attendance zones might be regarded as a per se violation of the four-
teenth amendment thereby triggering court scrutiny. This Comment
concludes by discussing alternatives that might alleviate busing
problems without resegregating school districts.
II. The Busing Remedy
De jure segregation, 9 which is sanctioned or imposed by state
action, was first identified as a violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown 1).30 In Brown I, four
cases were consolidated for argument.31 Each case involved a chal-
lenge to the validity of segregated public schools. The Warren Court
unanimously decided that the "separate but equal" doctrine,32 an-
nounced at the end of the nineteenth century in Plessy v. Ferguson,"3
had no place in a modern educational setting." The Court noted the
importance of primary and secondary education to a child's success
in the modern world.35 Concluding that separate schools are inher-
29. De jure segregation is legally sanctioned segregation. See Note, "Intention" as a
Requirement for De Jure School Segregation, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 653 (1976) (The author
clearly distinguishes de jure and de facto segregation. The latter is segregation not imposed by
state action.); Note, Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De
Facto/De Jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976). See also infra note 71 and accompanying
text.
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Id. at 486 n.I.
32.
[W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the separa-
tion of the two races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to
the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts of Congress requiring separate schools
for colored children in the District of Columbia, the constitutionality of which
does not seem to have been questioned, or the corresponding acts of state
legislatures.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1895). A Louisiana statute was upheld by the Court
in Plessy. The statute required trains to provide separate passenger cars for white and colored
races. Id. at 540.
33. 163 U.S. 537 (1895).
34. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
35.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the important of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportu-
nity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.
Id. at 493.
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ently unequal," the Court quoted the state tribunal: "Segregation of
white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect
upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the
sanction of law; .. .the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group." ' The
Court rescheduled the case for argument as to relief.
In Brown I1P8 the Court recognized that the relief needed to be
flexible in order to balance local and private needs. The Court rea-
soned as follows:
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be
guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been
characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies
and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private
needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional at-
tributes of equity power.39
Finally, the Court placed the primary duty on the school boards to
make a "prompt and reasonable start"'40 toward compliance with
Brown I. This duty, the Court later clarified, was the duty to inte-
grate with "all deliberate speed.""' When school boards hesitated to
follow the Court's decree, the Court decided that the time for "all
deliberate speed" had run out"2 and mandated that school boards
come forward with plans which realistically purported to work in the
present.'
The announcement of this requirement came in Green v. County
School Board."" The New Kent County school system operated a
freedom of choice plan under which black students could elect to go
to the white school and white students could choose to go to the
black school. Because the district was a rural system with a hetero-
geneous population, however, students took buses to their respective
36. Id. at 495. See also Taylor, The Crucial Role of Education in Achieving the Civil
Rights Goals of the 1980's, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 961 (1985).
37. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494.
38. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 295 (1955).
39. Id. at 300 (footnotes omitted).
40. Id. See also Wilkinson, Ill, The Supreme Court and Southern School Desegrega-
tion, 1955-1970." A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L. REV. 485 (1978). The author states that
the Court hid its head in the sand after Brown I. A decade after Brown I, less than three
percent of southern blacks attended desegregated schools. Some children entering kindergarten
when Brown I was decided graduated from totally segregated schools.
41. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968).
42. Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1963). Virginia and Prince Ed-
ward County were refusing to integrate.
43. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
44. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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schools."5
In a unanimous decision, the Court held that while such a plan
was not per se inadequate,"' the school system had an affirmative
duty to eliminate the effects of de jure segregation 47  "root and
branch."48 If such a plan fails to effectuate a conversion from segre-
gated schools to a unitary'9  school system, the school board has
failed to satisfy its affirmative duty.50 An adequate plan was appar-
ent in this case: neighborhoods were integrated and neutral attend-
ance zones would integrate the school populations.5
Formulating an adequate remedy proved far more difficult in
Charlotte, North Carolina. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education,52 the court applied the Green analysis to an
urban school district with 84,000 pupils in 107 schools.53 The ex-
isting dual school system 5 incorporated residential segregation by lo-
cating and sizing schools to accommodate racially distinct neighbor-
hoods.55 As in Greene, the school board adopted a freedom of choice
transfer plan that fell far short of fully integrating the school
45. Id. at 432. Of 1,300 pupils, 740 were black and 550 were white. None of the white
children elected to go to the black school and only 115 black children elected to go to the
white school. The buses serving the two schools travelled overlapping routes. Id.
46. Id. at 439. The United States Commission on Civil Rights has listed several factors
that contribute to the failure of freedom of choice plans to achieve the aspired results. The
factors as noted by the Court include:
I) Negro families fear retaliation from the white community if they choose to
have their children attend white schools;
2) Black children attending white schools are harassed by white classmates;
3) Pressure from public officials influences black parents' choice;
4) Embarrassment at not having suitable clothing deters some black families
from choosing white schools;
5) Some black school facility improvements have been made to encourage
blacks to continue to attend black schools.
Id. at 440 n.5.
47. See supra note 29.
48. Green, 391 U.S. at 438. The Court's footnote reads: "We bear in mind that the
court has not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible
eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the fu-
ture." Id. at 438 n.3 (quoting Louisiana v. U.S., 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1964)).
49. See supra note 9.
50. Green, 391 U.S. at 440-41. The Court felt that the freedom of choice plan operated
simply to shift the burden of integration to students and their parents. Brown !H placed this
duty "squarely" on the school board.
51. Id. at 442, n.6. The Court also recognized that the white school might be turned into
an elementary school for the whole county and the black school might be made into the sec-
ondary school or vice versa. Id.
52. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
53. Id. at 6. The school district consisted of the City of Charlotte and surrounding
Mecklenburg County. It covered an area 22 miles east-west and 36 miles north-south. Id.
54. The existing system was a classic dual system, developed in a state where segregated
schools were statutorily mandated. For a discussion of the earlier system, see Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Education, 369 F.2d 29, 30 (4th Cir. 1966).
55. Swann, 402 U.S. at 7.
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system. 56
Applying Green, the district court ordered the adoption of a new
plan which the school board had proposed and that a court-ap-
pointed expert had modified. The board plan bused secondary school
students to achieve full integration of student populations in junior
and senior high schools. Under the board's plan, elementary school
attendance zones were geographic zones (neighborhoods), gerry-
mandered to improve integration. The court expert's plan bused
black students to outlying white schools for grades one to four and
white students into black neighborhoods for grades five and six.88
Under court order, the school system adopted the plan as modified
by the court's expert.89
The Burger Court unanimously upheld the district court plan.60
Racial quotas, busing, drastic gerrymandering and attendance zones
received approval as legitimate tools to integrate school systems. 1 In
addition, the Court concluded that unitary schools are not required
to make year to year adjustments in the racial composition of schools
once the affirmative duty to desegregate is satisfied.62 District courts
need only remedy future problems after a showing that "the school
authorities or some other agency of the state has deliberately at-
tempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial com-
position of the schools .... "'
In light of Swann, it is likely that the elementary school plans
proposed by Norfolk6' and Oklahoma City" would not have been
acceptable as part of a desegregation plan.66 After school systems
attain unitary status, their prerogatives change because the courts
have returned control of school district affairs to local school
boards.67 The Riddick court decided unitary status changes the
56. Id.
57. Id. at 8-9. Over half of the elementary school students were to attend schools in
which more than eighty-six percent of the pupils would be of one race. Id. at 9.
58. Id. at 9-10.
59. Id. at II. The school board challenged the order. The Fourth Circuit remanded to
allow the school board to modify the elementary school plan. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 431 F.2d 138 (1970). The Supreme Court ordered reinstatement of the
district court's plan pending determination on remand. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 399 U.S. 926 (1970). The school board considered other elementary
school plans, but on August 7, 1970, adopted the court expert's plan. 402 U.S. at 11.
60. Swann, 402 U.S. I (1971).
61. Id. at 22-31.
62. Id. at 31-32. See also infra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
63. Swann, 402 U.S. at 32.
64. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
65. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
67. See supra notes 9, 24 and accompanying text.
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school board's position such that challengers are required to prove
that any resegregative action was taken with the intent to
discriminate."
A. Intent
The federal courts' basis for jurisdiction over school systems in
desegregation cases is founded in a constitutional violation.6 9 The
fourteenth amendment prohibits states from denying persons equal
protection of the laws.70 Showing a violation in a southern state,
which statutorily required racially homogeneous schools,71 is far less
difficult than in a state where no such statute exists.72
In Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,7s the Bur-
ger Court required a showing of de jure segregation as to a substan-
tial portion of a Colorado school district in order for the district
court to step in and supervise desegregation.74 The Colorado District
Court had found an undeviating purpose on the part of the school
board to separate students by race in one portion of the school dis-
trict.75 This finding, the Court reasoned, required the school system
to integrate in that section. 6 With respect to the remainder of the
school system, the core city, which was segregated in the same pro-
portion as the residential patterns,77 the court applied a novel ap-
68. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text, The legitimacy of this decision is
questionable. See infra notes 107-34 and accompanying text.
69. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954) (Brown I).
70. The fourteenth amendment, section one states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
71. See, e.g., Brown I, 347 U.S. 483, 486 n.I. The four cases consolidated under Brown
I came from states with statutes or state constitutional provisions which either permitted or
required segregated schools. Id.
72. See, e.g., Keyes v. School District No. I, Denver, Colorado, 413 U.S. 189, 191
(1973). The Colorado Constitution prohibited racial discrimination. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 8.
The school board segregated schools intentionally. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 198.
73. 413 U.S. 189 (1973). The opinion includes a fold-out map that helps the reader
understand the gerrymandering of attendance zones practiced to create segregated schools in a
suburb of Denver.
74. Id. at 203. Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that the
Court should have set forth a uniform national rule than have southern states be forced to
integrate while allowing the burden of proving intent (invidious discriminatory purpose) to
shelter northern segregated schools. Id. at 219-53 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
75. Id. at 199. See map in U.S. Reports at 214-15.
76. Id. at 192-94.
77. Id. See also Wolf, Northern School Desegregation and Residential Choice, P977
SUP. CT. REv. 63. The author posits that neighborhood school plans cause segregated neigh-
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proach.7 1 The district court opined that where segregation exists
without proof of state imposition (de facto segregation) a minimum
standard of equal educational opportunity, inferable from Plessy v.
Ferguson,9 requires desegregation (but not all-out integration) and
compensatory education. 0
The Supreme Court did not address this issue, but instead rec-
ognized a presumption of intentional segregation by the school board
as to all segregated schools in the district. This presumption arises
upon proof of segregative intent in a substantial portion of the school
district. It operates to shift the burden of proof to the school board
to show that other segregated schools are not the result of segrega-
tive action."' In the words of the Court, "it is both fair and reasona-
ble [to require] that the school [authorities] bear the burden of
showing that their actions as to other segregated schools within the
system were not also motivated by segregative intent."8 2
Shifting the burden of proof for policy reasons is totally legiti-
mate. Justice Brennan, delivering the Opinion of the Court, wrote,
"This burden-shifting principle is not new or novel. There are not
hard-and-fast standards governing the allocation of the burden of
proof in every situation. The issue, rather, 'is merely a question of
policy and fairness based on experience in the different situa-
borhoods. If the school is largely black, the mobile white population leaves. If it is largely
white, more whites will enter. Id.
78. Kutner, Keyes v. School District Number One: A Constitutional Right to Equal
Educational Opportunity?, 8 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (1979); compare the Court's framing of the issue
in Brown I; "We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 'tangible'
factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportu-
nities? We believe it does." 347 U.S. at 493.
79. 162 U.S. 537 (1895). Where separate facilities are present, at least equal educa-
tional opportunities are required. In Brown I the Court summarized the "separate but equal"
doctrine stating that "under th[e] doctrine, equality of treatment is accorded when the races
are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be separate." Brown I,
347 U.S. at 488.
80. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 194. See also supra note 77.
81. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. The Court describes the presumption:
[A] finding of intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful
portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a presumption that other seg-
regated schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in other
words, a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school
authorities, and shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other segre-
gated schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segrega-
tive actions. This is true even if it is determined that different areas of the school
district should be viewed independently of each other because, even in that situa-
tion, there is high probability that where school authorities have effectuated an
intentionally segregative policy in a meaningful portion of the school system,
similar impermissible considerations have motivated their actions in other areas
of the system.
82. Id. at 209.
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tions.' ",83 The Court shifted the burden to the school board not only
to justify its actions with logical, racially neutral explanations, but
also to prove that segregative intent was not a factor motivating its
actions.8 Having delineated the standard by which the school
board's actions should be judged, the Court remanded the case for
proceedings consistent with its opinion. 88
Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting in part, op-
posed the Court's affirmation of the de jure/de facto distinction.8"
The burden of proving intent, he reasoned, operates differently on
southern schools, which were statutorily segregated, than on north-
ern schools. He said "[i]nstead of recognizing the reality of similar,
multiple segregative causes in school districts throughout the coun-
try, the Court persists in a distinction whose duality operates un-
fairly on local communities in one section of the country and on mi-
nority children in the others."87 Recognizing that the de jure/de
facto distinction is an allocation of the burden of proof, Justice Pow-
ell argued that constitutional rights under the equal protection
clause should not be different depending on where one lives. He
posited:
[T]he familiar root cause of segregated schools in all the
biracial metropolitan areas of our country is essentially the
same: one of segregated residential and migratory patterns the
impact of which on the racial composition of the schools was
often perpetuated and rarely ameliorated by action of public
school authorities. This is a national, not a southern, phenome-
non. And it is largely unrelated to whether a particular State
had or did not have segregative school laws. 88
Although he advocates a uniform rule, Justice Powell would re-
83. Id. (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486 (3d ed. 1940)).
84. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. See supra note 81.
85. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 214. Justice Rehnquist in dissent argues that remanding for pro-
ceedings consistent with the opinion is essentially a reversal, which should have been barred by
the two court rules. Id. at 265 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
86. "In my view we should abandon a distinction which has long outlived its time, and
formulate constitutional principles of national rather than merely regional application." Keyes,
413 U.S. at 219 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). See Note, Milliken v. Bradley: Turn-
ing the Buses Around, 1975 DET. C.L. REV. 125 (1975). This note discusses policy considera-
tions that might justify a distinction between northern and southern school systems in regard
to integration policy. The note asserts that the demographics of northern cities make the price
of busing higher.
87. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 253 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). Cf. Note, School
Desegregation Doctrine: The Interaction Between Violation and Remedy, 30 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 780 (1980). The author argues that the distinction is a purposeful allocation of the bur-
den of proof designed to operate differently in the North and South.
88. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
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affirm the flexibility requirements of Brown I1P9 and not require inte-
grated school populations at such high costs.
The single most disruptive element in education today is the
widespread use of compulsory transportation, especially at ele-
mentary grade levels. This has risked distracting and diverting
attention from basic educational ends, dividing and embittering
communities, and exacerbating, rather than ameliorating, inter-
racial friction and misunderstanding. It is time to return to a
more balanced evaluation of the recognized interests of our soci-
ety in achieving desegregation with other educational and socie-
tal interests a community may legitimately assert. This will help
assure that integrated school systems will be established and
maintained by rational action, will be better understood and
supported by parents and children of both races, and will pro-
mote the enduring qualities of an integrated society so essential
to its genuine success.90
Powell would make access to a court remedy for segregated schools
available to more school children, but have the courts balance the
sacrifices required to maintain busing more carefully than they pres-
ently do.91
Justice Rehnquist in dissent, argued that the Court should nar-
row the availability of a judicial remedy.92 He noted that the district
89. Id. at 251. See also note 39 and accompanying text.
90. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 253 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
91. Id. at 251.
92. Id. at 254. In 1970 Chief Justice Rehnquist, while serving as Assistant Attorney
General in Charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, wrote two memoranda proposing a constitu-
tional amendment that would help maintain segregated schools. Section I of the Rehnquist
amendment reads:
No provision of the Constitution shall be construed to prohibit the United
States, any State, or any subdivision of either from assigning persons to its edu-
cation facilities on the basis of geographic boundaries, provided only that such
boundaries are reasonably related to school capacity, availability of transporta-
tion, safety or other similar considerations.
Rehnquist, Memo, at 4 (March 3, 1970) (Available from Leadership Conference on Civil
Rights, telephone: (202) 667-1780). This section validates neighborhood schools, and prohibits
courts from requiring gerrymandering to achieve integration.
Section 2 reads:
No provision of the Constitution shall be construed to prohibit the United
States, or any State, or any subdivision of either from permitting persons to
choose or transfer voluntarily among its education facilities, provided only that
the opportunity to choose or transfer is available either to all persons within its
jurisdiction or to any eligible person, when standards of eligibility are reasonably
related to school capacity, availability of transportation, availability of curricu-
lum, safety or other similar consideration.
Id. Courts would be forced to accept freedom of choice plans such as those invalidated in
Green and Swann. See supra notes 46 and 56; cf. TAYLOR, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED REHN-
QUIST AMENDMENT (1986) (available from Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, telephone:
(202) 667-1780).
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court took into account the probative value of intentional discrimina-
tion in other areas in its core city examination and still found evi-
dence of intent too attenuated to require all-out desegregation.93 He
would therefore have limited the desegregation remedy to correspond
to the findings of fact of the trial court.94
The policy of limiting the remedy for racial discrimination
found favor in Washington v. Davis.95 The case questioned the valid-
ity of using a literacy test as a qualifier for the District of Columbia
police force despite the failure of the force to show a correlation be-
tween the test and job performance.96 The Court reasoned that the
test's discriminatory effect was not conclusive. 9 The test predicted
success on job training achievement exams and the force actively re-
cruited blacks." The Court held that the intent requirement neces-
sary to trigger judicial redress of racial discrimination is an "invidi-
ous discriminatory purpose,"9 9 which was not present.
Rogers v. Lodge'00 explained some evidentiary principles to con-
sider when proving intent. The Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's finding that the county's at-large voting scheme' 01 for elect-
93. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 258-59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 264-65. Rehnquist stated:
I believe that a District Judge thoroughly sympathetic to the plaintiffs'
claims gave them the full evidentiary hearing to which they were entitled and
carefully considered all of the evidence before him. He showed full awareness of
the evidentiary principle that he might infer from the 'segregative intent' with
which he found the Board to have acted in the Park Hill area a like intent with
respect to the core area, but he deliberately declined to do so. This was his pre-
rogative as the finder of fact, and his conclusion upon its affirmance by the
Court of Appeals is binding upon us.
Id. Cf. infra note 104 (clearly erroneous standard).
95. 426 U.S. 229 ().
96. Id. at 231-35.
97.
We have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise
within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than of
another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touch-
stone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.
Id. at 242.
98. Id. at 235.
99. Id. at 239. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256
(1979) further clarified that the intent behind an invidious discriminatory purpose is not one
intending the foreseeable consequences of one's action. Instead one must intend specifically to
discriminate. Knowledge on the part of the state that its action will discriminate does not
constitute the necessary intent to violate the fourteenth amendment.
100. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
101. Id. at 615. All voters voted for all county commissioners who ran for numbered
seats. Blacks represented a majority of the population in the county, but had a minority of
registered voters. This was because of past discriminatory voting practices such as literacy
tests, poll taxes, and white primaries. No black had ever been elected county commissioner. It
was found highly likely that at least some would have been elected if representation had been
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ing county commissioners promoted a discriminatory purpose.1"2 Ad-
dressing the issue of intent, the Burger court approved of the district
court's consideration of all the aggregate facts in a local appraisal of
the design and impact of the voting scheme."0 Unequivocally apply-
ing a clearly erroneous standard,1 0 4 the majority affirmed the district
court's factual determination of invidious discriminatory intent.
10 5
The voting scheme allowed whites to maintain political control
by utilizing the low voter registration rate among blacks.
Evidence of historical discrimination is relevant to drawing
an inference of purposeful discrimination, particularly in cases
such as this one where the evidence shows that discriminatory
practices were commonly utilized, that they were abandoned
when enjoined by courts or made illegal by civil rights legisla-
tion, and that they were replaced by laws and practices which,
though neutral on their face, serve to maintain status quo."0"
Clearly, historical discrimination is not sufficient to prove intent, but
it is relevant to the showing of a discriminatory purpose.
B. Unitariness
In Green v. New Kent County School Board,107 the Court iden-
tified the criteria for unitariness as including a desegregated faculty,
staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities, facilities, and compo-
sition of student body. 08 When the supervising court is satisfied that
these criteria are met, it may return control of the school system to
the school board.' 0 9 This section discusses several possible interpreta-
tions of the effect a finding of unitariness has on further court inter-
vention. First, the courts may not be able to intervene absent a show-
ing of invidious discriminatory purpose. Second, intervention may be
permitted upon a deliberate action with a discriminatory effect
which frustrates the purpose of court imposed remedies. Last, as-
suming that a showing of discriminatory purpose is required when a
by district. Id. at 623-24.
102. Id. at 616. At-large voting schemes allow the political majority, white in this case,
to elect all of the representatives. A political minority has a better chance of gaining some
voice in the political process if the representatives are elected by district.
103. Id. at 622 (citing White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973)).
104. "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
105. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623 (Rehnquist, C.J., Powell, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 625.
107. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). See also supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
108. Id. at 435.
109. See supra notes 9 and 24.
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school system was integrated under court order, a presumption of
intent may attach to a violation of that order.
The first interpretation is supported by Riddick v. School Board
for the City of Norfolk." ' The Riddick court held that a finding of
unitariness places a school board in the same position as a school
that has never been shown to have discriminated. " ' This interpreta-
tion is seriously flawed in that the heavy burden to obtain judicial
review allows for wholesale violation of the desegregation systems
which courts so painfully developed. " 2
The allocation of the burden of proof was a matter of first im-
pression in Riddick.1 3 In order for the court to sustain a challenge
to the school board's resegregative action, the court required the
challengers to show that the action was taken with a discriminatory
purpose. " This allocation was based on the holdings in Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education"5 and Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler." 6
While discussing the duties of a unitary school system, the
Swann Court stated that while neither courts nor school districts are
required to alter the racial composition of schools once the school
desegregates, the courts are not powerless to act on future problems.
The Swann Court continued that absent a showing of a deliberate
attempt to alter or fix demographic patterns to affect the racial com-
position of schools, court intervention is not necessary after a show-
ing of unitariness. 17 The wholesale redrawing of attendance zones is
an extreme attempt to alter demographic patterns. Segregated
schools tend to segregate neighborhoods. More importantly, the
court must have assumed that an attempt to change the racial com-
position of schools would not take the form of dismantling the elabo-
rate attendance plans that the courts so painfully developed. In ei-
ther case, court intervention - rescrutiny of the desegregation plan
- is required under Swann.
In Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,' 18 the Court
held that the right guaranteed by Brown v. Board of Education"9 is
110. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986).
111. See supra notes 6-19 and accompanying text.
112. See infra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
113. Riddick, 784 F.2d 521, 534.
114. Id. at 538. "We hold that the burden of proving discriminatory intent attaches to a
plaintiff once a de jure segregated school system has been found to be unitary."
115. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 118-121.
117. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
118. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
119. 347 U.S. 483. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
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not the right to an integrated school, but is the right to be free from
racial discrimination. The district court order to continually readjust
the racial composition of the schools, however, was reversed by the
Supreme Court.12 This result was prefaced by the condition that
"[tihese shifts were not attributable to any segregative actions on
the part of the [Board]."'' In Riddick, the problem was not the
school board's refusal to rebalance the racial composition of schools,
but instead was the deliberate action to alter the racial make up of
its schools.
Some policy concerns, however, support the Riddick ap-
proach,'22 even though precedents do not. In Keyes v. School Dis-
trict No. 1. Denver, Colorado,2 3 the Supreme Court required the
burden of proof, if not clearly placed, to be allocated in a fair and
reasonable manner.' 24 Prior to Riddick, the Supreme Court's deseg-
regation policies have operated to burden southern schools more than
northern schools. 28 The Riddick approach puts all schools on equal
footing. More importantly, the federal government is not in the busi-
ness of running public schools - the states are. Therefore, return of
complete control to schools boards is a high priority.
The second interpretation, where court review follows a deliber-
ate action with a discriminatory effect, finds support in Dowell v.
Board of Education of Oklahoma City.'26 The Dowell court held
that a finding of unitariness does not require a new showing of dis-
criminatory intent. Such an allocation of the burden of proof func-
tions to throw the parties back to the "proverbial first square. 1 27
The Dowell court held that a finding of unitariness will not remove
injunctions imposed to force school boards to implement desegrega-
tion plans. Therefore, school boards must seek modification to alter a
court ordered plan. 8 This interpretation is essentially a deliberate
action test. If the school board deliberately acts and the effect is to
change the racial make up of the schools toward resegregation, then
the courts should review the action. In the event of a deliberate
change in demographic patterns to alter the racial make up of
120. Pasadena, 427 U.S. at 434.
121. Id. at 440-41.
122. The Riddick approach requires a showing of discriminatory purpose on the part of
the school board prior to court intervention. See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
123. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
124. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
126. 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1986). For a discussion of the Dowell case, see notes 21-
27 and accompanying text.
127. Dowell, 759 F.2d at 1520.
128. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
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schools, 12 9 a modification of injunction hearing is required by Swann.
In accordance with equitable principles, court review could be
based on the enjoined party taking an action to frustrate the purpose
of the injunction. The court need not find a new violation of the con-
stitution, but rather would scrutinize only the particular action com-
plained of for a possible roll-back effect. If the action reverses what
the court previously ordered, the court could step in with its equita-
ble powers.
Strong policy reasons could justify a third interpretation. A
showing of intent may be required by a finding of unitariness be-
cause the policy of returning control to local boards elected to run
the schools is compelling. When a school board's action substantially
dismantles the court-ordered desegregation plan and incorporates
into the new program lingering aspects of de jure segregation, 1 0
however, a presumption of a discriminatory purpose could be
recognized.
For example, consider the situation in which a school board de-
cides to substantially dismantle the busing program at the elemen-
tary level and replace it with a neighborhood school plan. Many
neighborhood school plans are closely tied to lingering aspects of de
jure segregation.1 ' Neighborhood schools that operated under de
jure segregation tended to segregate neighborhoods. Black families
moved to be near black schools while white families moved to be
near white schools. The schools were also sized and located to reflect
the racial make up of neighborhoods. With busing, this effect is cir-
cumvented. But, if a school board stops busing, previous de jure seg-
regation, preserved in the racial composition of neighborhoods, oper-
129. See supra note 117.
130. Cf. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (discussed supra notes 100-106 and
accompanying text). The first element provides a neutral state action with a disproportionate
impact. The second combines a prerequisite of historical de jure segregation with present ac-
tion, which is presumed purposeful.
131.
The construction of new schools and the closing of old ones are two of the
most important functions of local school authorities and also two of the most
complex. They must decide questions of location and capacity in light of popula-
tion growth, finances, land values, site availability, through an almost endless list
of factors to the considered. The result of this will be a decision which, when
combined with one technique or another of student assignment, will determine
the racial composition of the student body in each school in the system. Over the
long run, the consequences of the choices will be far reaching. People gravitate
toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response to the needs of
people. The location of schools may thus influence the patterns of residential
development of a metropolitan area and have important impact on composition
of inner-city neighborhoods.
Swann, 402 U.S. I, 20-21 (1970).
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ates to resegregate the schools. This could be presumed intentional
segregation because the school board is incorporating the neighbor-
hood racial make up, schools sizes, and locations into its attendance
plan. 1
32
Large scale dismantling of desegregation plans, which incorpo-
rate such vestiges of state imposed segregation, could be recognized
as a special situation requiring judicial review. This presumption is
analogous to the one the Swann Court recognized: that one-race
schools were not per se unconstitutional, but presumptively
discriminatory.
While developing a desegregation plan, the school board has the
burden of proving that any one-race or virtually one-race school is
not the result of any present or past discriminatory action on its
part.1 33 A similar burden, showing the absence of discriminatory
purpose, could attach when, as in Riddick and Dowell, a school
board dismantles a busing plan and appears to incorporate the ves-
tiges of past discrimination.
This author recommends that any test be combined with in-
structions to heed the admonitions stated by Justice Powell in
Keyes.134 He recommended that courts be more mindful of the spirit
of Brown II, that they be flexible in the use of their equitable pow-
ers, and that they value more highly the public interest. Specifically,
Justice Powell said courts should recognize that extensive busing of
elementary school students often does more harm than good. 3 6
III. Alternative Judicial Remedies
Over the years options to ease the burden of busing have been
implemented by various courts in conjunction with desegregation
132. In Green, the court established an affirmative duty to eliminate the effects of state
imposed segregation "root and branch." 391 U.S. 430, 434 (1968). When school boards failed
to eliminate their segregated neighborhoods, they elected busing. To back slide after skirting
their affirmative duty might require that the burden of proof on challengers to obtain court
review be lowered to an action and effects test.
133. Swann, 402 U.S. I, 26 (1971).
Where the school authority's proposed plan for conversion from a dual to a
unitary system contemplates the continued existence of some schools that are all
or predominantly of one race, they have the burden of showing that such school
assignments are genuinely nondiscriminatory. The court should scrutinize such
schools, and the burden upon the school authorities will be to satisfy the court
that their racial composition is not the result of present or past discriminatory
action on their part.
Id.
134. 413 U.S. 189, 217-53 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). See supra
notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
135. 413 U.S. 189, 253 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). See supra note
90 and accompanying text.
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plans. Courts and school boards together could devise new methods
that would enhance school districts. Remedies that have been tried
include special interest or magnet schools, new facilities located so as
to maximize integration, and extra-.urricular functions designed to
increase inter-racial interaction. Other remedies could include volun-
tary interdistrict busing, freedom of choice plans enhanced by after-
school day-care, and incentive to integrate busing plans.
Magnet schools, special interest schools that attract students
from all parts of the district, are used in some urban areas 13 as a
central feature of a desegregation plan. Students are voluntarily
bused to schools offering enhanced curricula in various areas. These
artistic, scientific, trade, business, and remedial schools serve to at-
tract students to centrally located schools, easing the difficulties of
integrating the remaining schools.
137
Extra-curricular activities and the relocation of new schools are
programs that may not have been considered feasible when school
desegregation plans were implemented. With declining school enroll-
ments, 3 1 it may now streamline a school district's program to close
some inefficient facilities and simultaneously enlarge and modernize
centrally located facilities. Administrative problems have also
changed regarding extra-curricular activities. Declining enrollment
may allow school systems to run curriculum enhancement program
such as gifted and remedial programs after school in integrated set-
tings. This might change the number of students who need to be
bused by changing racial quotas considered necessary to create inte-
grated schools.
Another remedy to be considered would be voluntary interdis-
trict busing.' 39 In some places, lily white schools exist blocks away
from all black schools separated by district lines.'4 0 Such schools
might voluntarily allow limited integration to enhance the education
136. Note, Magnet Schools: An Attractive Desegregation Alternative, 13 J. LEGIS. 48
(1986).
137. Id.; see also DiCava & Kindregan, Public Education in Greater Boston: Does
America's Commitment to Equality and Integration Stop at the City Line?, I I SUFFOLK U.L.
REV. 1245 (1977). The authors argue for more funds and legislation to create a metropolitan
school district with busing to magnet schools.
138. In both Riddick, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986) and Dowell, 795 F.2d 1516 (10th
Cir. 1986), the school systems experienced substantial decreases in enrollment.
139. The Supreme Court, in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken 1),
reversed a court order of interdistrict busing. Not all of the Detroit school districts, which
would have been integrated under the lower court plan had been shown to have intentionally
discriminated; therefore, an interdistrict busing order was not allowed. See also Note, Consti-
tutional Law - School Desegregation - Interdistrict Relief Under New Equal Protection
Standard, 40 Mo. L. REv. 635 (1977).
140. Jordan, The Black Underclass Untouched by Brown, 23 How. L.J. 61, 62 (1980).
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offered without court orders. Interdistrict programs might succeed if
each school offered a different enhanced curriculum or if one school
devoted its energies to remedial programs, while the other concerned
itself with gifted programs. The number of students who would need
to be bused long distances intradistrict could be reduced. School dis-
tricts could offer after-school day care as a special incentive to chil-
dren who choose to be bused. After-school day care programs could
be enhanced with special interest material or they could be oriented
to unique educational needs. As with most of these remedies, they
school system would be improved while the busing burden is eased.
The facts in Dowell present the most interesting possibility for a
remedy.""1 In Dowell, when a community became integrated it be-
came entitled to a neighborhood school. The problem arose when
borderline schools became integrated and busing distances from core
city schools to the outer suburbs increased. If busing had continued,
it might create a strong public interest in integrating the neighbor-
hoods. The interest in integration could be so strong that outer sub-
urbs would lobby for low cost, public housing in their school dis-
trict.14 Core city planners might plan urban renewal programs while
preserving a percentage of low income housing in gentrified
neighborhoods.
Present residential segregation, whether caused by or the cause
of segregated schools,14 could largely be eliminated by incentives to
integrate. In order to escape busing, suburbs might recruit rather
than steer away black families.
The proper forum for such a remedy might be the legislature
rather than the judiciary. The judicial prerogatives are limited to
intentional segregation""' and city or school district borders. 45 Inte-
grated neighborhoods would alleviate not only the problems of pro-
viding a racially balanced education and the financing dilemma
141. See supra note 20.
142. See Comment, Federal Housing and School Desegregation: Interdistrict Remedies
Without Busing, 25 ST. Louis U. L.J. 575 (1981). This comment discusses a St. Louis pro-
gram to integrate neighborhoods by selective location of HUD housing.
143. See supra notes 77 and 130.
144. See supra notes 69-106 and accompanying text.
145. See Comment, Metropolitan Desegregation: Buttressing the Barrier of Milliken v.
Bradley, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 507 (1977) ("Shifting residential patterns in major metropoli-
tan areas, taking the shape of an ever retreating white ring encircling an ever-expanding black
core, have rendered desegregation remedies confined to the black inner-city essentially ineffec-
tive."). See also Note, Developing Litigation Strategies for Multidistrict Relief: The Legal
Implications of Milliken v. Bradley on Metropolitan School Desegregation, I I URBAN L.
ANN. 187 (1976). The author explicates from Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), the
circumstances under which interdistrict desegregation orders are available. The Milliken case
gave factors required to uphold a court order to integrate fifty-four districts in Detroit.
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caused by an incredible variance between tax bases, 146 but it may
also alleviate other social problems such as large ghettos and metro-
politan spread.
Social scientists have studied the problems of integrating neigh-
borhoods. 47 There is a certain racial mix at which white families
become discontented and white flight begins.148 The previously
mixed neighborhood spontaneously changes to a black neighborhood.
Social scientists could identify racial quotas for the neighborhoods
involved in an incentive-to-integrate busing program.1 49 School sys-
tems would then set goals for integration so that as the neighborhood
approaches the racial quota, the school would qualify for stand-alone
status. Busing would .cease and stable integrated communities would
result.
Courts should be encouraged, when reviewing busing orders, to
avoid the mindset that busing is the only remedy. If busing is caus-
ing problems in the local community, experimentation with new pro-
grams to alleviate those problems is warranted.
IV. A Carrot for Congress
The fourteenth amendment empowers Congress to remedy vio-
lations of the equal protection clause.' 50 While the power to curb
busing is questioned,' 51 the power to provide alternative remedies for
de jure segregation remains largely unused.' 52 If Congress were to
provide viable alternative remedies, courts might willingly allow the
wholesale elimination of busing programs.
In addition to legislative enactment of the various remedies dis-
cussed in the previously section, 5 ' Congress might legitimize one-
146. Cf. Fleutroy, The Struggle of Blacks for Equal Educational Opportunity: An
Overview, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 605, 632-34 (1977) [hereinafter Struggle] (the author
discusses California constitutional controversy over inequality of funding schools by local prop-
erty taxes).
147. See generally Note, Tipping the Scales of Justice: A Race-Conscious Remedy for
Neighborhood Transition 90 YALE L.J. 377 (1980) [hereinafter Tipping] (the author includes
an extensive listing of authorities pertaining to social science evidence on the integration of
neighborhoods).
148. "The tipping theory posits that every community has a 'tipping point,' a specifiable
numerical ratio of blacks to whites beyond which the rate of white migration out of a transi-
tional area will increase rapidly, eventually yielding a predominantly black community." Tip-
ping, supra note 147, at 379.
149. Tipping, supra note 147, at 379 n. 11.
150. Section 5 states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
151. See GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 721-23 (11 th ed. 1985).
152. See generally Vaughn, Congressional Power to Eliminate Busing in School Deseg-
regation Cases, 31 ARK. L. REv. 231 (1977).
153. See supra notes 136-49 and accompanying text.
UNITARINESS AND BUSING
race schools. While Brown I determined that separate schools are
inherently unequal, 154 Congress could possibly overcome this premise
by providing enhancement programs in impoverished neighborhoods.
Special schools cognizant of the unique pressures faced by minorities
could provide supplemental programs. Such schools might be imple-
mented pursuant to appropriate legislation and might survive court
scrutiny as a substitute for busing elementary school students. If, for
example, the dropout rate declined, the problems of juvenile delin-
quency lessened and center city students' scores on standardized test
improved over present bused school system results, school systems
could overcome the basic premise of Brown I.
In Berkley, an experimental program was conducted in the early
1970's that created special schools for ethnic students in an attempt
to alleviate the problems blacks and chicanos were experiencing in
the public schools. "5 The Berkley theory postulated that public
schools failed with many black and chicano students because the
schools incorporated the white, middle class biases in their curricu-
lum.10 Therefore, these special schools offered remedial programs to
help equalize the students' opportunities. Whenever possible, the
programs were centered around ethnic materials rather than those
used in mainstream education.15 7 These same schools encountered
difficulty because they offered these programs on a racial basis.'58
If Congress either amended Title VI or set up the programs
based on some non-racial criteria, busing of elementary school stu-
dents could cease. The costs of such programs might be recovered in
lower incarceration costs, lower welfare costs, and increased tax
base."
The Supreme Court, if and when it decides to consider the issue
posed by Riddick"' and Dowell,'6' should use the possibility of dis-
mantling busing orders as an incentive to encourage the legislature
to create alternative remedies. Elementary school busing, as Justice
Powell indicated in his separate opinion in Keyes," 2 is not a wonder
154. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
155. See Comment, Alternative Schools For Minority Students: The Constitution, The
Civil Rights Act and The Berkley Experiment, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 858 (1973) [hereinafter
Berkley Experiment]; see also Struggle, supra note 146, at 627-32.
156. Berkley Experiment, supra note 155, at 858.
157. Id. at 860.
158. Struggle, supra note 146, at 629-32.
159. Taylor, The Crucial Role of Education in Achieving the Civil Rights Goals of the
1980's, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 961, 969 (1985).
160. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986).
161. 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1986).
162. 413 U.S. 189, 217 (1973). See supra note 90.
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drug; busing young children has side effects which school systems
seek to avoid. Riddick and Dowell exemplify this principle and indi-
cate that the time has come for the courts to reevaluate the busing
remedy.
V. Conclusion
Because public policy requires an early return of the control of
schools to local boards, the return of control must be qualified. When
courts determine that a school system is unitary under the criteria
defined in Green,11 3 control is returned. Return of control, however,
does not include leave to dismantle desegregation orders without
court supervision. If school boards seek to modify busing orders,
courts, mindful of the flexibility instruction of Brown 1I,164 should
cooperate in creative experimentation with alternatives. If public in-
terest requires modification of busing orders, especially at the ele-
mentary school level, courts should also look to Congress for a rem-
edy using the possible removal of busing orders as an incentive to get
the political majority interested in the well-being of minority school
children. Justice Blackmun, speaking for the Court in Washington v.
Seattle School Dist. No. 1,165 said ". . . the political majority may
generally restructure the political process to place obstacles in the
path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of governmental ac-
tion . . . .State action of this kind . ..places special burdens on
racial minorities within the governmental process." '66 The challenge
for the courts is to make the protection of minority rights the inter-
est of the majority. This can be accomplished by holding the revoca-
tion of elementary student busing orders out as a carrot to encourage
Congress to legislate alternative remedies for de jure discrimination.
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163. 391 U.S. at 435. See also supra note 9.
164. See supra text accompanying note 39.
165. 458 U.S. 457 (1982). That case involved a state statute prohibiting busing absent a
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166. Id. at 470. Justice Blackmun paraphrases Justice Harlan's concurrence in Hunter
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